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Abstract—Detection and rejection of adversarial examples in
security sensitive and safety-critical systems using deep CNNs
is essential. In this paper, we propose an approach to augment
CNNs with out-distribution learning in order to reduce misclas-
sification rate by rejecting adversarial examples. We empirically
show that our augmented CNNs can either reject or classify
correctly most adversarial examples generated using well-known
methods (> 95% for MNIST and > 75% for CIFAR-10 on
average). Furthermore, we achieve this without requiring to train
using any specific type of adversarial examples and without
sacrificing the accuracy of models on clean samples significantly
(< 4%).
I. INTRODUCTION
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have become pop-
ular due to their high accuracy for image and video analysis.
Despite their strong performance, it has been demonstrated
that they are highly susceptible to adversarial examples, es-
pecially when dealing with high dimensional inputs such as
images [30; 29]. An adversarial image is one that has been
perturbed with a noise signal designed to fool the CNN. While
CNNs confidently misclassify such adversarial examples1,
they are perceptually similar to the original image and easily
recognizable by humans (See Figure 1).
Many algorithms for generating adversarial examples have
been proposed (e.g.,[11; 18; 7; 24]). Those algorithms can
broadly be classified as either white-box or black-box attack
algorithms. In white-box attacks, an adversary knows the target
classifier’s exact model parameters and learns adversarial ex-
amples over it. In contrast, in black-box attacks, an adversary
does not have any knowledge about the target classifier.
Therefore, in a black-box attack setting, an adversary learns
adversarial examples over a local CNN without access to the
target classifier. However, due to the transferability [30] of
black-box adversarial images, target CNNs can still be highly
vulnerable to them [30; 13].
Furthermore, another serious challenge for CNN-based sys-
tems is that when a test sample comes from a different concept
or class that is not part of the training set (i.e., in-distribution
samples), then CNNs assign them to one of the predefined
classes they are trained on, possibly with high confidence.
We call such samples as natural (i.e., not synthetically gen-
erated) out-distribution samples as they are semantically and
*The first two authors contributed equally
1We use the terms adversarial image and adversarial example interchange-
ably throughout this paper.
Fig. 1: Adversarial examples for MNIST (first row) and
CIFAR-10 (second row). From left to right: original images,
T-FGS, FGS, DeepFool, and C&W (L2) adversarial examples
statistically different from the in-distribution samples. From a
decision-making perspective, this is of great concern as CNNs
show confidence that is clearly inappropriate, particularly
for security sensitive tasks. This behavior demonstrates that
neural networks do over-generalization in some regions that
are empty of in-distribution samples (i.e., belonging to out-
distribution samples).
With the aim of addressing these challenges, in this paper
we propose to add an additional dustbin class containing
(i) natural out-distribution samples (i.e., natural samples that
are statistically and semantically different from in-distribution
samples), and (ii) interpolated in-distribution data (created by
interpolating selected pairs of in-distribution samples from two
different classes) to train an augmented CNN. We show that
such an augmented CNN has a lower error rate (i.e., misclassi-
fication rate) in the presence of adversarial examples because
it either correctly classifies adversarial samples or rejects them
to the dustbin class. Reducing misclassification rate of CNNs
is critical for developing secure and dependable CNN-based
intelligent systems, particularly in hostile environments. We
show that an augmented CNN that is only trained on natural
out-distribution samples has the capability of learning more
flexible feature space where most of the adversarial examples
can be safely separated from in-distribution samples.
In brief, our contributions are as follow:
• We propose a simple yet effective approach to reduce
misclassification rate of CNNs for black-box adversarial
examples by adding a dustbin class to learn a better
feature space.
• Unlike previous approaches our approach i) does not
need access to adversarial examples for training, ii) does
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not require additional networks (e.g.,CNNs, autoencoders
etc.) to detect adversarial examples, and iii) does not
noticeably sacrifice accuracy on clean samples.
• We demonstrate the robustness of our augmented CNNs
against well-known attacks (see Sections III and VI). Our
augmented CNNs can either reject or classify adversarial
examples correctly > 95% of the time for MNIST and
> 75% of the time for CIFAR-10 on average.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II
we review relevant work. We give a brief introduction to
well-known attack methods that we used for evaluating our
approach in section III. In section IV we clearly explain our
assumptions about the adversary’s capabilities and knowledge
about the target system. We introduce our method in section
V, and evaluate it in section VI. We conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
It has been shown that adversarial examples are easy to
generate and they are very successful in fooling even CNNs
whose parameters are not known to the adversary (i.e., black-
box attacks) [30; 17; 11]. Here, we introduce works that
address adversarial examples in image classification for both
white-box and black-box attacks.
Detection and Rejection: To mitigate the risk of adversarial
examples, detection procedures have been proposed for identi-
fying and rejecting adversarial examples [20; 9; 23; 12; 1]. For
instance, [20; 12] stated that adversarial samples are actually
statistically different from clean samples. So [12] augments
the output of a CNN with an extra dustbin label (a.k.a. reject
option), then train it on clean training samples and their
corresponding adversarial samples (assigned to dustbin) in
order to enable CNNs to detect and reject such adversarial
samples. However, this assumes that all adversarial sample
generation approaches are known and that a diverse set of
adversarial samples are accessible for training. Li [20] utilized
a cascade classifier to detect adversarial examples, however [5]
demonstrated that this method is not always effective. In [9],
authors used kernel density estimation in the feature space
to identify adversarial samples, with mixed results given that
some of the adversarial samples still become entangled with
clean samples, which appears difficult to handle by kernel
methods. In [22] one or more autoencoder networks are used
for detecting adversarial examples by using the reconstruction
error for adversarial examples. In [32], authors proposed
detecting adversarial examples by looking at the difference
between the prediction of three CNNs trained on the original
images, modified images with reduced the color bit depth
of pixels, and modified images that are spatially. Further, in
addition to learning two or more additional CNNs, they need
to learn a threshold for detection over adversarial examples
which may change from one dataset to another.
Robust CNNs: In [27], authors reduce the effectiveness
of adversarial samples by using distillation networks. Also,
in [26], authors reduce the sensitivity of the CNNs to noise
by producing very small gradients at the cost of sacrificing
accuracy. However, both those methods are not effective for
(a) MLP (b) Augmented MLP
Fig. 2: Two-moons synthetic dataset.(a) MLP trained on only
in-distribution samples (b) the augmented MLP trained on both
in-distribution and some out-distribution samples
transferable perturbations and further it has been shown that
they can be broken easily [6]. There are couple of works
which employed a pre-processing step to denoise inputs in
order to classify adversarial examples correctly. For example,
in [4], authors used PCA to reduce feature space and remove
unnecessary information including noise, and in [8] authors
used JPEG compression to remove noise from images and
then classify the compressed images. However, both reduce
the the accuracy of the CNN and are therefore not practical
on large datasets.
In all previously discussed defense methods, either access
to a variety of adversarial examples or learning additional
networks is needed. The methods that do not have such over-
heads sacrifice the accuracy of the model for clean samples by
reducing image quality. In contrast, our augmented CNNs are
more robust to adversarial examples by rejecting them without
needing adversarial samples for training, or using additional
networks, or sacrificing accuracy.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is constructed by a
sequence of blocks, which each consists of convolution, ReLU
and pooling layers, followed by a couple of fully connected
layers. As the last layer, there is a softmax layer that translates
the final fully connected layer outputs to class prediction. In
other words, the output of a CNN is treated as a probability
vector, where each element denotes conditional probability of
each class for a given input x. A CNN can be represented by
function Y = F (x, θ) where x ∈ [0, 1]d is an input image and
θ represents its parameters (i.e., weights and biases).
Generally, an adversarial generation method can either
be targeted or untargeted. In targeted attacks, an adversary
aims to generate an adversarial sample that makes a vic-
tim CNN misclassify it to the victim selected target class
(i.e., argmaxF (x+δ) = y′, where y′ is the targeted class and
6= y∗ the actual class). In an untargeted attack, an adversary
aims to make the victim CNN to simply misclassify an image
to a class other than the true label (i.e., argmaxF (x+δ) 6= y∗,
where y∗ is the true class). Here, we briefly explain some well-
known targeted and untargeted attack algorithms.
Targeted Fast Gradient Sign (T-FGS) [16]: This targeted
attack method tends to modify a clean image x so that the
loss function is minimized for a given pair of (x, y′), where
target class y′ is different from the input’s true label (y′ 6= y∗).
To this end, it uses the sign of gradient of loss function as
follows:
xadv = x− .sign(∇J(F (x, θ), y′)), (1)
where J(F (x, θ), y′) is the loss function and  as the hyper-
parameter controls the amount of distortion. The transferability
of T-FGS samples increases by utilizing larger  at the cost of
adding more distortions to the image. Moreover, the untargeted
variant of this method called FGS[10] is as follows:
xadv = x+ .sign(∇J(F (x, θ), y∗)). (2)
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign (I-FGS) [18]: This method ac-
tually is an iterative variant of Fast Gradient Sign (also called
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [21]), where iteratively
small amount of FGS’s perturbation is added by using a small
value for . To keep the perturbed sample in α-neighborhood
of x, the achieved adversary sample in each iteration should
be clipped.
x0adv = x
xk+1adv = clipx,α{xkadv + .sign(∇J(F (xkadv, θ), y∗))},
(3)
Compared to FGS, I-FGS generates more optimal distortions.
DeepFool [24]: This algorithm is an iterative but fast approach
for creation of untargeted attacks with very small amount of
perturbations. Indeed, DeepFool generates sub-optimal pertur-
bation for each sample where the perturbation is designed to
transfer the clean sample across its nearest decision boundary.
Carlini Attack (C&W) [7]: Unlike previous proposed meth-
ods which find the adversarial examples over loss functions of
CNN, this method defines a different objective function which
tends to optimize misclassification as follows:
f(x′) = max(max{Z(x′)y′ − Z(x′)y∗},−κ) (4)
Here Z(x) is the output of last fully connected (before
softmax) layer and x′ is perturbed image x. Also κ denotes
confidence parameter. A larger value for κ leads the CNN to
misclassify the input more confidently, however it also makes
finding adversarial examples satisfying the condition (having
high misclassification confidence) difficult.
IV. ADVERSARY MODEL
It has been shown that it is easy to break detection and
rejection approaches when an adversary has access to details
of the classifiers as well as detectors (i.e., white-box at-
tacks) [14; 7]. However most real-world classifiers (e.g., online
classifier services) do not publish the details of their classifiers
or their defenses. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that
adversarial examples are highly transferable to other CNNs
even when their used parameters and hyper-parameters are
unknown to an adversary (i.e., black-box attacks) since CNNs
have been shown to share similar boundaries [31]. Some recent
works such as feature-squeezing [32] consider another setting
that we refer to as gray-box attacks, where the details of the
target CNN (i.e., parameters and hyper-parameters) are known
to the adversary but the underlying defenses (i.e., detectors)
are undisclosed.
Fig. 3: Interpolated samples for MNIST and CIFAR10. Third
row represents the interpolated samples that are composed of
images from first (source) and second rows (target).
In this paper, we focus on black-box adversarial attacks as
they can readily be utilized to target any unknown CNN. To
create adversarial examples that can be transferred to fool
target CNNs, an adversary needs to train local classifier(s).
Thus, we assume that she has access to some clean samples
(excluding dustbin samples) to learn a classifier and she is
not aware of the utilized defenses and classifiers’ hyper pa-
rameters. Moreover, we assume that the adversary has enough
resources to generate any type of adversarial attacks.
V. PROPOSED METHOD
It has been argued that a central element explaining the
success of deep neural networks is their capacity to learn
distributed representations [2]. Indeed, this allows such models
to perform well in the regions that are only sparsely sampled
in the training set, specially in a very high dimension space.
However, neural networks make totally arbitrary decisions in
the regions that are outside of the distribution of the learned
concepts, leading to over-generalization. For instance, the
classification regions achieved from two MLPs on the well-
known two-moons dataset are illustrated in Fig. 2. Adding a
dustbin class by including some out of distribution samples
to the training set leads to more accurate decision regions,
and therefore the over-generalization effect in these out-
distribution regions can be reduced. In this paper, we leverage
this to reduce over-generalization by training an augmented
CNN with a dustbin class for which available natural out-
distribution images are used as training samples. We then
investigate the effect of this over-generalization reduction on
five known powerful adversarial attacks (discussed in Sec-
tion III). Indeed, as seen in Figure 4, we find that the over-
generalization reduction leads to a more expressive feature
space where all natural out-distribution samples along with
many black-box adversarial examples are separated from in-
distribution samples to be classified as belonging to the dustbin
class. Further, some adversarial instances are even placed very
close to their corresponding true class, leading the augmented
CNNs to classify them correctly.
Interpolated Data: To increase the rejection power of the
Clean &out-dist. FGS T-FGS
M
N
IS
T
N
ai
ve
C
N
N
A
ug
m
en
te
d
C
N
N
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
N
ai
ve
V
G
G
ug
m
en
te
d
V
G
G
Fig. 4: Visualization of some randomly selected test samples and their corresponding adversaries (FGS and T-FGS) in the
feature spaces (the penultimate layer) learned by a naive CNN and an augmented CNN. To produce and manipulate the 3D
plots refer to https://github.com/mahdaneh/Out-distribution-learning_FSvisulization
augmented CNN on adversarial examples generated using
powerful attack algorithms that generate small amount of smart
adversarial perturbations (e.g. DeepFool and C&W attacks),
we utilize some interpolated images that are generated from
in-distribution samples as training sample for dustbin class.
Our intuition is that an adversarial example simultaneously
contains the relevant features from two classes (i.e., the target
class and the true class), where the features of the fooling
class are hardly visible while the features related to the true
class can be recognizable for human observers. Accordingly,
we interpolate some images from in-distribution samples and
ensure each resulting image has the features from two differ-
ent classes. To create interpolated data, we simply add two
weighted images together as follows:
Ici,cj ,α = αIci + (1− α)Icj (5)
Here, Ici and Ici are images from source and target classes.
Also, α is a mixing-ratio parameter.
Pair Selection: For generating interpolated data, considering
all possible combinations of classes for all training samples
of a large-scale dataset and using them for training can be
computationally expensive. Therefore, we randomly select a
subset of samples from each source class (choosing 1500
samples out of 5000 samples in our simulation). Then, for
each selected source sample, its nearest neighbor which is
located in another class is found. To do so, we exploit the
penultimate layer of a naive CNN as a feature extractor [3; 2]
so that we can accurately measure the similarity between
images in the feature space rather than in the pixel space.
Furthermore, finding nearest neighbors in feature space is
considerably faster than finding them in pixel space due to
noticeably smaller dimensionality of feature space (e.g.,512
vs 3072 for CIFAR). Finally, using α = 0.5, we generate an
interpolated sample for each pair of source image and its target
image. , we can say interpolated image samples belong equally
to the source and target classes. Larger (or smaller) values for
α leads the accuracy of CNNs to drop and false positive rate to
increase, since interpolated data would be very similar to clean
samples. Figure 3 shows some interpolated samples along with
their source and target images.
Out-Distribution Samples: To choose out-distribution sam-
ples, we considered images with objects that are totally
different from objects in training and test set images. The
number of out-distribution samples added to dustbin class
depends on the number of clean examples and number of
classes. A very large dustbin class compared to other classes
leads the generalization error to increase and a small ones
does not improve the resiliency of our augmented CNN. For
our evaluation, we increased the training set by 50%.
VI. EVALUATION
Using MNIST [19] and CIFAR-10 [15], we empirically
evaluated our proposed method against black-box adversarial
samples which are generated using five different well-known
attack algorithms. Specifically, we compared the error rates
of augmented CNNs with that of naive CNNs for adversarial
examples. Here the error rate represents the percentage of
wrong decisions made by CNNs for adversarial examples.
That is, where the adversarial examples are neither rejected
nor correctly classified. Therefore, we compute the error rate
as 1− (accurate calssification rate+ rejection rate). We
also compared the accuracy of the naive and augmented CNNs
for clean samples.
MNIST with NotMNIST: MNIST is a popular machine
learning dataset that contains labeled gray scale images, where
each image holds a hand-written digit. As out-distribution
samples for MNIST, we considered NotMNIST dataset2 that
consists of 18,724 letters A-J printed with different font styles.
Images of both MNIST and NotMNIST datasets have the same
size images (28 × 28 pixels). We used a CNN named cuda-
convnent that has three convolution layers with 32, 32, and 64
filters of 5 × 5, respectively, and one Fully Connected (FC)
layer with softmax activation function3. In addition, dropout
with p = 0.5 is used at the FC layer for regularization. To
train an augmented version of cuda-convnet, we utilized a
training set comprising 50K MNIST training samples as in-
distribution data and 10K randomly selected samples from
NotMNIST dataset along with 15K interpolated samples (see
SectionV) generated from MNIST training samples as out-
distribution samples. The remaining samples from NotMNIST
(≈8K) in conjugation with MNIST test samples are considered
for evaluating the augmented CNN.
CIFAR-10 with CIFAR-100: Training and test sets of CIFAR-
10 contain 50K and 10K RGB images (32×32 pixels each). As
out-distribution samples for CIFAR-10, we consider CIFAR-
100 dataset. To reduce a conceptual overlap between the labels
from CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we ignore super-classes of
CIFAR-100 that are conceptually similar to CIFAR-10 classes.
So, vehicle 1, vehicle 2, medium-sized mammals, small mam-
mals, and large carnivores are excluded from CIFAR-100.
Note, all the images are scaled to [0, 1], then normalized by
mean subtraction over the CIFAR-10 training set. For CIFAR-
10, we chose VGG-16 [28] architecture that has 13 convolution
layers with filter size 3x3 and three FC layers. To train an
augmented VGG-16, 15K randomly selected samples from
the non-overlapped version of CIFAR-100 along with 15k
interpolated samples from CIFAR-10 training set (labeled as
dustbin class) are appended to CIFAR-10 training set.
2Available at http://yaroslavvb.blogspot.ca/2011/09/notmnist-dataset.html.
3To read more about the configuration of this CNN, the readers should
refer to https://github.com/dnouri/cuda-convnet/blob/master/example-layers/
layers-18pct.cfg
Evaluation: As adversarial examples are transferable to other
CNNs [30; 25], we learned adversarial examples using T-FGS,
FGS and DeepFool approaches over independently trained
instances of cuda-convnet CNN for MNIST and VGG16 for
CIFAR-10. All correctly classified test samples from each
dataset are regarded for adversarial example generation by
each of the aforementioned attack algorithms. For FGS and
T-FGS attacks, we utilized  = 0.2 for MNIST and  = 0.03
for CIFAR-10. For I-FGS attacks,  = 0.003 along with
α = 0.05 for CIFAR-10 and  = 0.02 along with α = 0.2 for
MNIST are used. To generate targeted Carlini attack (called
C&W) [7], we used the authors’ github code. Due to large time
complexity of C&W, we considered 100 randomly selected
images for each dataset. For each selected image, as was done
in previous work [32], two targeted adversarial samples are
generated, where the target classes are the least likely and
most likely classes according to the predictions provided by
the underlying CNN. Thus, in total 200 C&W adversarial
examples are generated per dataset. To increase tranferability
of C&W, we utilized κ = 20 for MNIST and κ = 10 for
CIFAR-10 (see Fig.1 for some adversarial examples).
The results are shown in Table I, where, "Acc." denotes the
accuracy of models in classification of adversarial examples,
and column “Rej.” represents the percentage of adversarial
samples rejected by the augmented CNNs (i.e.,classified as
dustbin). Finally, "Err" (= 1− (”Acc.” + ”Rej.”)) shows the
misclassification rate (i.e. the percentage of wrong decisions).
As seen in Table I, augmented CNN maintains the same
accuracy as naive CNN for clean MNIST test samples, while
accuracy of augmented VGG on clean CIFAR-10 test samples
drops by ≈ 4% points when compared to naive VGG.
Even though our augmented CNNs are not trained on
adversarial inputs generated using any specific algorithm, they
were able to reject (classify as dustbin) most of the adversarial
inputs generated using 5 well-known attack algorithms pro-
posed in literature, and even correctly classify a small portion
of them. For example, our augmented CNN either rejected or
correctly classified almost 96% of the adversarial examples
on average, while the Naive CNN misclassified 79% of them.
Similarly, for CIFAR-10, the misclassification rate reduces to
24% for augmented VGG when the Naive VGG misclassifies
55% of the adversarial sample on average. Further, as shown in
this table, adding interpolated data to dustbin class improved
the adversarial sample detection rate over just using natural
out-distribution data.
Compared to the most recent defense approach [32], we
achieved a lower error rate on average over FGS, I-FGS
and DeepFool attacks against CIFAR-10 and MNIST. For
FGS attacks against MNIST, our error rate was 1% more
than what was reported in [32] (0%). However, unlike the
approach in [32] we achieved the low error rate (1%) without
having to learn additional CNNs. For C&W attacks though, our
method had higher error rate (15.1% for MNIST and 21.5%
for CIFAR-10) compared to what was reported in [32] (0%).
However, apart from not having to learn additional CNNs, we
Training set: <in-dist, out-dist.> <MNIST, —> <MNIST, NotMNIST> <MNIST, NotMNIST+intrpl.> <CIFAR-10, —> <CIFAR-10, CIFAR100> <CIFAR-10, CIFAR100+intrpl.>
Model Naive CNN Augmented CNN Augmented CNN Naive VGG Augmented VGG Augmented VGG
In-dist. test Acc. 99.5 99.47 99.48 90.53 88.58 86.65
Out-dist. test Rej. - 99.96 99.98 - 95.36 96.21
FGS
Acc 35.14 19.15 0.35 36.16 27.65 23.94
Rej – 65.19 99.59 - 38.94 49.23
Err 64.86 15.66 0.06 63.84 33.41 26.83
I-FGS
Acc 16.37 30.97 0.0 50.34 45.98 41.92
Rej - 27.08 100 - 18.57 25.88
Err 83.63 41.95 0.0 49.66 35.45 32.2
T-FGS
Acc 19.99 1.17 0.0 36.24 27.06 24.2
Rej - 95.92 100 - 40.54 50.77
Err 80.01 2.91 0.0 63.76 32.4 25.03
DeepFool
Acc 1.89 11.45 5.37 56.82 45.63 42.31
Rej - 4.72 89.84 - 31.0 38.86
Err 98.11 83.83 4.8 43.18 23.37 18.83
C&W (L2)
Acc 22.49 27.5 7.5 42.5 46.5 39
Rej - 5.99 77.49 - 18.5 39.5
Err 77.51 66.51 15.01 57.5 35 21.5
Average Error rate 80.82 42.17 3.97 55.59 31.92 24.88
TABLE I: Performance on black-box adversaries attacks. “Acc.” corresponds to accuracy (the rate of correctly classified
samples), “Rej.” is the rejection rate, while “Err.” is the misclassification rate All results reported are percentages (%).
also used a higher4 value for κ (κ = 20 for MNIST; κ = 10 for
CIFAR-10) to generate more transferable attacks. For example,
for κ = 0 our naive MNIST CNN itself was able to correctly
classify 97% of C&W adversarial samples as compared to only
22.49% of C&W adversarial samples for κ = 20.
Moreover, to show how adding a dustbin class can effect
the feature space learned by a CNN, we plotted the feature
spaces obtained from the last convolutional layers of a naive
CNN and its corresponding augmented CNN for clean test
samples and their corresponding black-box FGS and T-FGS
adversarial examples. In Figure 4, one can see that adversarial
examples are located very close to the in-distribution samples
in the feature space of a Naive CNN. While our augmented
CNN, which is trained on both in-distribution and natural
out-distribution samples, is able to disentangle the adversarial
samples from in-distribution samples in its feature space even
though it was not trained on adversarial examples generated
using any specific attack approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we empirically demonstrate how CNNs aug-
mented with out-distribution learning can either reject or
correctly classify adversarial examples. Unlike previously pro-
posed approaches our out-distribution learning approach does
not rely on having access to adversarial examples which is
useful as the approaches for generating such examples rapidly
change and evolve. However, our approach is not foolproof
and we aim to assess our method with other attack models
and on larger datasets. Also, we plan to assess our approach
against white-box attacks and explore how it can be combined
with other defenses to further reduce the error rate.
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